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Abstract
In this article we study the allocation of a budget to
promote an opinion in a group of agents. We assume
that their opinion dynamics are based on the well-
known voter model. We are interested in finding the
most efficient use of a budget over time in order to
manipulate a social network. We address the prob-
lem using the theory of discounted Markov decision
processes. Our contributions can be summarized as
follows: (i) we introduce the discounted Markov de-
cision process in our cases, (ii) we present the corre-
sponding Bellman equations, and, (iii) we solve the
Bellman equations via backward programming. This
work is a step towards providing a solid formulation
of the budget allocation in social networks.
1 Introduction
During the last decades a lot of research effort has
been devoted to model the underlying process of opin-
ion formation of agents that interact through a social
network. In this respect, DeGroot’s [1] or Friedkin-
Johnsen’s [2] models are classic references. Another
classic model is the voter model [3, 4] which consid-
ers that each agent holds a binary opinion, 0 or 1,
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and at each time step, each agent chooses one of its
neighbors at random and adopts that opinion as its
own. Other works, based on the voter model, in-
corporate stubborn agents [5], and biased agents [6].
Moreover, the last few years there has been an in-
creasing literature about manipulation of opinion in
social networks [7, 8, 9].
In this work, we are interested in finding the most
efficient use over time of a budget in order to ma-
nipulate a social network. The idea is to promote
an opinion by paying agents to supplant their true
opinions. We model opinions as two values, 0 or 1,
with 1 (0) representing supportive (non-supportive)
opinion.
We frame the problem of designing sequential pay-
ment strategies as a discounted Markov decision pro-
cess (DMDP). DMDPs have been widely used to for-
mulate many decision making problems in science
and engineering (see, e.g., [10, 11, 12]). One of the
main applications of DMDP models is the compu-
tation of optimal decisions (i.e., actions) over time
to maximize the expected reward (analogously, min-
imize the expected cost).
First of all, we focus on a fully connected network
where agents change their opinion following a voter
model. We provide the correspondent Bellman equa-
tions to solve this problem and we show through an
example how to solve the stated problem in practice.
We provide a structural characterization of the asso-
ciated value function and the optimal payment strat-
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egy. Then, we compute the optimal payment using
dynamic backward programing.
2 Model definition
In order to find the optimal budget allocation on bi-
nary opinion dynamics, we make extensive use of the
theory of DMDPs. First, we adopt the voter model
of opinion formation over a social network. Then,
we define the DMDP and the corresponding Bellman
equations to obtain the optimal strategy of budget
allocation.
Consider an undirected social network G = (I,E),
where I stands for the set of agents, indexed from 1
to n, and E ⊆ I × I is the set of edges. Each agent
i ∈ I has a binary initial opinion. Opinions take val-
ues 0 or 1. If agent i has opinion 0 (analogously, 1)
we label it as non-supporter (supporter). For exam-
ple, if agents are discussing about politics, 1 could be
supporting a particular party and 0 not supporting
it.
Moreover, we distinguish two cases, depending on
whether the network is fully connected or not.
We start by studying the fully connected case. In
each decision epoch, agents update their opinions fol-
lowing a voter model sensitive to external payments.
Let β ∈ [0,1) be the discount factor, which represents
the loss of reward in the future with respect to the
current reward. A discounted Markov decision pro-
cess (DMDP) is a 5-tuple (S,AS ,P ,R, β), where S is
a finite set of states, AS is a finite set of actions, P
is the set of transition probabilities and R is the set
of rewards.
Therefore, the model is defined as follows:
1. Decision epochs: the set of decision epochs is
defined as t = 1,2, . . . , T . We consider a finite
discrete-time system. At each decision epoch t
we observe the state s and choose an action a.
2. States: the state space S of the DMDP consists
on the possible number of supporters, s ∈ N,
s = ∣{i ∈ I ∣ i is a supporter}∣.
3. Actions: the action space As is the set of ac-
tions available in state s (without loss of general-
ity, actions are state independent). We consider
that the actions a ∈ N are the possible number
of payments, a = ∣{i ∈ I ∣ i receives a payment}∣,
where the non-supporter agents have a cost cNS
for changing their opinion from non-supporter
to supporter, and the supporter agents, a cost
cS to hold their supporter opinion. We assume
that the cost of changing their opinion is higher
than the cost of holding it, i.e., cNS > cS . We
consider a finite budget b. Notice that, because
the actions are constrained by the budget, they
are stationary.
4. Transition probabilities: if the DMDP in de-
cision epoch t is at state s1, the probability
that it transitions to state s2 taking action a
is denoted pt(s1, s2, a). Due to the natural in-
dependence of agents transitions, we compute
those probabilities as the product of the tran-
sition probabilities of the agents. The evolution
of one agent i ∈ I will be described by the voter
model. Starting from any arbitrary initial labels,
supporter (S) or non-supporter (NS), we con-
sider two labeling functions fS(i) and fNS(i),
where fS(i) = 1 (fNS(i) = 1) means that agent
i is a supporter (non-supporter). At each de-
cision epoch t, each node selects uniformly at
random one of its neighbors opinion. For each
node j ∈ I, the set of its neighbors is defined as
N(j) = {k ∈ I ∣ {j, k} ∈ E}. Therefore, we define
for one i ∈ I with zero-payment in decision epoch
t the labeling functions,
f t+1S (i) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 with prob.
∣{j∈N(i)∣ft
S
(j)=1}∣
∣N(i)∣
,
0 with prob.
∣{j∈N(i)∣ft
S
(j)=0}∣
∣N(i)∣
,
f t+1NS(i) = 1 − f t+1S (i)
Analogously, for one agent k ∈ I that receives a
payment in decision epoch t we define:
f t+1S (k) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 with prob. 1,
0 with prob. 0,
f t+1NS(k) = 1 − f t+1S (k)
As we said, we assume that the graph is
fully connected, therefore each agent can com-
municate with every other agent. We de-
note the set of non-supporter agents that
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receive a payment as L = {i ∈ I ∣
non-supporter & receives a payment} and its
cardinality as ℓ = ∣L∣. Respectively, the set of
supporter agents that receive a payment as K =
{i ∈ I ∣ supporter & receives a payment} and
its cardinality as k = ∣K∣. Notice that a = ℓ + k.
Therefore the transition probabilities
pt(s1, s2, a) can be computed as:
● If a > s2 then pt(s1, s2, a) = 0.
● If a < s2 then
pt(s1, s2, a) =
min{s1−k,s2−ℓ}∑
i=max{0,s2−(n−s1)−k}
(s1 − k
i
)(s1
n
)i (n − s1
n
)s1−k−i
⋅ ( n − s1 − ℓ
s2 − i − (ℓ + k)) ⋅ (
n − s1
n
)n−s1−s2+i+k (s1
n
)s2−i−(ℓ+k)
5. Reward: the instant reward in time t and state
s is defined as rt(s) = ∑i∈I g ⋅ s, where g denotes
the reward provided by one agent.
Let υβ be the value function of the above DMDP,
i.e., it is the supreme, over all possible budget alloca-
tion strategies, of the expectation of the discounted
reward starting from an initial budget b. Under these
assumptions, the Bellman equations for all s ∈ S and
initial budget b are:
υβ(s, b) = max
a=ℓ+k∈AS ,
(ℓ⋅cNS+k⋅cS)≤b
E
∞
∑
t=0
βtrt(s)
= max
a=ℓ+k∈AS ,
(ℓ⋅cNS+k⋅cS)≤b
{r0(s) + ∑
s′∈S
βp1(s, s′, a)
⋅ υβ(s′, b − ℓ ⋅ cNS − k ⋅ cS + r0(s))},
where the budget evolves as
b(t + 1) = b(t) + rt(s) − ℓ ⋅ cNS − k ⋅ cS .
Next, we present the second case where in each de-
cision epoch agents update their opinions following a
voter model in a network (not necessarily fully con-
nected) that can be affected by external payments.
As before, we design this problem as a DMDP where
the set of actions are the possible external payments.
Therefore, let β ∈ [0,1) be the discount factor, we
consider, by a slight abuse of notation, the 5-tuple
(S,AS ,P ,R, β) as before. Concretely, the elements
changed from the previous model:
1. Decision epochs: the set of decision epochs is
defined as t = 1,2, . . . , T .
2. States: the state space S of the DMDP, con-
sists on all possible combinations of agents’ la-
bels, non-supporter (0) or supporter (1), i.e.,
s ∈ {0,1}n.
3. Actions: the action space As is the set of actions
available in state s (without loss of generality, ac-
tions are state independent). An action means
whether or not we give a payment to each of the
agents, a ∈ {0,1}n, where a 0 (respectively 1)
in position i means we give no payment (pay-
ment) to agent i ∈ I. We also define a vector
of costs c ∈ Rn
+
whose element ci > 0 is the cost
of changing by one unit the opinion of agent i,
in case agent i is non-supporter, or the cost of
holding the opinion of agent i, in case agent i is
a supporter.
4. Transition probabilities: as before, if the DMDP
in decision epoch t is at state s1, the probability
that it transitions to state s2 taking action a is
expressed as pt(s1, s2, a) and can be computed
as:
● If ∣a∣ > ∣s2∣ then pt(s1, s2, a) = 0.
● If ∣a∣ < ∣s2∣ then pt(s1, s2, a) is equal to
n∏
i=1
I{ si = s′i}[I{si = supp} ∣{j ∈ N(i)/f
t
S(j) = 1}∣∣N(i)∣
+ I{si = non-supp} ∣{j ∈ N(i)/f tNS(j) = 1}∣∣N(i)∣ ]
+ I{si ≠ s′i}[I{si = supp ∣{j ∈ N(i)/f
t
S(j) = 0}∣∣N(i)∣
+ I{si = non-supp} ∣{j ∈ N(i)/f tNS(j) = 0}∣∣N(i)∣ ].
5. Reward: the instant reward in time t and state
s is defined as rt(s) = gT ⋅s, where g is the vector
of rewards whose element gi is the reward that
agent i ∈ I provides.
Let υβ be the value function of the above DMDP,
i.e., it is the supreme, over all possible budget alloca-
tions strategies, of the expectation of the discounted
reward starting from an initial budget b. Under these
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assumptions the Bellman equations for all s ∈ S and
initial budget b are:
υβ(s, b) = max
a∈AS ,
cT ⋅a≤b
E
∞∑
t=0
β
t
rt(s)
= max
a∈AS,
cT ⋅a≤b
{r0(s) + ∑
s′∈S
βp1(s, s′, a)υβ(s′, b − cT ⋅ a + r0(s))},
where the budget evolves as b(t + 1) = b(t) − cT ⋅ a +
R(st) and cT denotes the transpose of vector c.
3 Simulation results
We suppose that after a time T we will not obtain
rewards for the supporter agents, so we are interested
in the distribution of the DMDP in the time interval
[0, T ]. We consider an undirected, fully connected
social network G = (I,E) with n = 7 agents that form
opinions with a voter model. In time t = 0, we assign
at random an initial label to each agent. Solving the
Bellman (fixed point) equations, given the model and
the set of states and feasible actions, gives us the best
strategy for each state to follow in the time interval.
We take T = 6, β = 0.8, cNS = 10, cS = 5, B = 30 and
g = 8.
Some conclusions can be drawn from the simula-
tions. The optimal payment strategy is to invest all
our budget paying to the higher number of agents
at time t = 0. Obviously, if all the network is non-
supporter (respectively supporter), the budget will
be allocated to change opinions (to hold opinions).
However, the distribution of the budget differs for
the rest of possible initial states as we show on Table
1.
Initial state
Budget Allocation
Payments to NS Payments to S
s = 1 2 1
s = 2 2 2
s = 3 1 3
s = 4 1 4
s = 5 0 5
s = 6 0 6
Table 1: Budget allocation over the states.
Given the budget allocation at time t = 0, we show
in Figure 1 the expected reward obtained at time T
for each state s ∈ S.
Figure 1: Expected reward at time T .
4 Conclusions
In this work, we have introduced the problem of
budget allocation over time to manipulate a social
network. We have developed a formulation of the
discounted Markov decision process as well as the
corresponding Bellman equations for the voter model
of opinion formation. Using backward programming,
we have obtained the optimal payment strategy for
a small example of agents interacting trough a fully
connected network. Many questions still remain
to be answered. Future work would be devoted to
improve the performance of our simulations in order
to obtain the optimal strategy for larger networks
and different topologies. Moreover, we intend to
construct the DMDP model and the Bellman equa-
tions for different models of opinion dynamics. This
will lead to the mathematical characterization of the
optimal policy for different network structures and
opinion formation models. It will lead also to the
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characterization of the most important agents (the
agents with highest benefit-cost ratio) which should
be related with its centrality as shown in previous
results [9, 7].
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